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1 Introduction 
During the 1840s, Britain experienced a period of financial turbulence. Railway share prices 
rose and fell dramatically during the Railway Mania, there was a surge and then crash in the 
price of corn, and a Commercial Crisis followed. The development of an asset price reversal, 
a commodity price reversal, and problems in the commercial and banking sectors within such 
a short period of time makes this a particularly interesting episode, and the variety and 
intensity of events makes it a useful study in how to deal with financial instability.  
The turbulence began with the Railway Mania, which occurred between 1843 and the autumn 
of 1845, during which the prices of railway shares doubled, and thousands of new railway 
lines were projected. However, share prices then fell, and the railway industry endured a 
sustained downturn.  The corn market also experienced a sharp price reversal soon 
afterwards, with prices rising rapidly between the summer of 1846 and June 1847, but then 
falling sharply thereafter. This exposed merchants who had speculated on prices remaining 
high, leading to the failure of a number of firms within the corn sector in August 1847. The 
problems quickly spread to other merchants and financial institutions, producing difficulties 
within the money market. The situation was compounded by the low reserve of the Bank of 
England, which restricted the ability of the Bank to supply credit. The panic was only 
relieved in October 1847 when the government relaxed the constraints within which the Bank 
operated. 
The response of the British government to each of these developments can provide some 
insights into the challenges of legislating for stability. Parliament introduced several 
measures which could potentially have mitigated the extent of the difficulties, but these were 
generally ineffective. In some instances there was a conflict between stability and other goals, 
in other instances legislation had unintended consequences, whilst in most cases the focus 
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was on small incremental changes which minimised opposition. The most effective policy 
was introduced in the midst of the crisis, when these considerations were less influential. 
Although this intervention may have increased moral hazard, by increasing expectations that 
similar policies would be pursued in future crises, the benefits almost certainly outweighed 
the costs. 
The analysis in this paper suggests that designing legislation ex-ante, before the nature and 
extent of the instability is clear, can be challenging. Proposals for financial reform may have 
some marginal benefit, but measures which are stringent enough to prevent future crises are 
unlikely to be politically acceptable. This implies that is probable that periods of financial 
distress will occur again, and the authorities should be prepared to intervene robustly when 
the next episode of instability arises. 
This paper also contributes to our historical understanding of the financial events of the 
1840s, building on other literature which has discussed the development of the Railway 
Mania
1
, and the Commercial Crisis
2
. In addition, it increases our understanding of specific 
                                                          
1
 Bryer, R. A. 2003, “Accounting for the ‘Railway Mania’ of 1845–a Great Railway Swindle?” Accounting, 
Organisations and Society, 16(5/6):439-486, McCartney, Sean, and A. J. Arnold 2003, ‘The Railway Mania of 
1845-1847: Market Irrationality or Collusive Swindle Based on Accounting Distortions?’  Accounting, Auditing 
and Accountability Journal 16(5): 821-52. Odlyzko, A. 2010, Collective Hallucinations and Inefficient Markets: 
The British Railway Mania of the 1840s, University of Minnesota. 
2
 Andréadès, A. 1909, History of the Bank of England, P.S. King & Son, London, Clapham, J. 1944, The Bank 
of England: a History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Gayer, A.D., Rostow W.W. and Schwartz A.J. 
1953, The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790-1850, Oxford University Press, Ward-Perkins, 
C.N. 1950, ‘The Commercial Crisis of 1847’, Oxford Economic Papers, 2(1):75-94, Dornbusch, R. and Frenkel, 
J.A. 1984, ‘The Gold Standard and the Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847’, in Bordo, Michael D., and 
Schwartz Anna J., Eds., A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821–1931, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago and Boot, H.M. 1984, The Commercial Crisis of 1847. Hull: Hull University Press, Occasional 
Papers in Economic and Social History No. 11. 
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episodes of bubbles and crises, adding to research on periods such as the Tulip Mania
3
, the 
South Sea Bubble
4
, the Mississippi Scheme
5
, and the Great Depression
6
. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 explores the Railway Mania, Section 3 
considers the corn price reversal, Section 4 examines the Commercial Crisis, with Section 5 
being a brief conclusion.  
2 Railway Mania 
The British Railway Mania of the mid-1840s was characterised by a widespread enthusiasm 
for investing in railway shares. The industry had essentially begun in 1830, with the opening 
of the Liverpool and Manchester railway, but during the subsequent years many other lines 
were projected, and by 1842 there were 1,951 miles of railway track open in Great Britain
7
. 
However, the early 1840s had been a period of poor economic growth, and the demands of 
paying for the construction of new lines had led to difficulties within the industry. 
Railway share prices then began to rise rapidly, almost doubling between January 1843 and 
August 1845, as shown in Figure 1. Improvements in the economy, and a reduction in fares 
by the railways, led to higher passenger numbers, revenues and profits, and an analysis of 
those railways established before the Mania, suggests that their dividends rose steadily from 
4.4 per cent of par value in 1843 to 7.0 per cent in 1847
8
. The projection of new railway 
                                                          
3
 Garber, P.M. 2001. Famous First Bubbles, the Fundamentals of Early Manias, MIT Press. 
4
 Dale, R., Johnson, J.E.V. and Tang, L. 2005. Financial Markets can Go Mad: Evidence of Irrational Behaviour 
during the South Sea Bubble. Economic History Review, 58(2):233-271. 
5
 Velde, F.R., 2007. "John Law's System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, 
97(2):276-279. 
6
 Bernanke, B.S. 1983, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression, 
The American Economic Review, 73(3):257-276; Eichengreen, B. And Temin, P. 2000, “The Gold Standard and 
the Great Depression,” Contemporary European History 9(2):183-207; Romer, C.D. 1990. “The Great Crash 
and the Onset of the Great Depression”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(3):597-624; Grossman, R.S. 
1994, “The Shoe that Didn’t Drop: Explaining Banking Stability During the Great Depression”, The Journal of 
Economic History, 54(3):654-682. 
7
 Mitchell, B. R. 2003, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-2000, Palgrave Macmillan, 674 
8
 Author’s calculation based on dividend data from the Course of the Exchange. 
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schemes also increased dramatically during this period. The number of railway securities 
listed on the London Stock Exchange underestimates the extent of promotion as only a small 
proportion ever achieved a listing, but the number of listed securities appears to follow the 
pattern in prices with a lag, as shown in Figure 1. These new schemes offered payment terms 
which were initially very attractive to investors, as individuals could subscribe for shares by 
paying just a small deposit, rather than the total cost immediately. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 >> 
In the autumn of 1845 railway share prices began to fall, declining by 18.2 per cent between 
their peak in August 1845 and the end of November 1845. After a brief recovery, prices 
continued to fall until April 1850, with a decline of 57.5 per cent from peak to trough. The 
initial declines coincided with the onset of economic difficulties associated with a poor 
harvest and the onset of the Irish Famine
9
. Perhaps of greater long-term importance was the 
unprecedented volume of railway promotion which peaked in the latter half of 1845. During 
the downturn the railway industry struggled to complete many of the lines which it had 
attempted to construct, and many lines were abandoned or suspended
10
. However, many other 
lines did open, trebling the size of the network to 6,123 miles by 1850
11
, but they tended to 
earn lower returns, and increased competition within the network, leading to the dividend/par 
ratio of the railway industry falling from a peak of 7.0 per cent in 1847 to just 2.4 per cent by 
1852
12
. During subsequent decades there was a legacy of low returns on capital. 
The key drivers of the Mania were changes in dividends, the projection of new companies, 
and the instalment payment plans for shares. The government could have restrained the 
                                                          
9
 Economist, October 18, 1845, 997 
10
 Lewin, H.G. 1936, The Railway Mania and its Aftermath, 1845-1852, The Railway Gazette, 480-483 
11
 Mitchell, B. R. 2003, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-2000, Palgrave Macmillan, 674 
12
 Author’s calculation based on dividend data from the Course of the Exchange. 
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speculation, at least to some extent, by targeting any or all of these factors. Although it did 
make some attempts to do so, its policies were generally ineffective, as will be discussed in 
the remainder of this section. 
2.1 Regulation of Profits 
The initial increase in railway dividends during the mid-1840s was a major factor in the 
development of the Railway Mania, with investors bidding up share prices in response to the 
higher payouts which were expected. If the government had regulated how much profits the 
railways could have earned, and consequently how much of a dividend they could pay, 
speculation amongst investors about future returns could have been diminished. As it could 
be argued many of the early railways were earning monopoly profits, given the limited 
competition on the pre-Mania network, such a restriction would not necessarily be 
unjustified. 
Indeed, an extensive Parliamentary Select Committee investigation into the railways in 1844 
suggested that the government should have certain rights over railways which were earning 
high profits. They proposed that the state should have the option to purchase a railway, or to 
revise its fares, if it was earning an annual profit greater than 10 per cent of its paid up capital 
in fifteen years
13
. The purchase option would allow a railway to be purchased for 25 times 
profits, whilst the revision option would allow the government to lower fares if they 
compensated the railway company for any reduction in profits this caused. William 
Gladstone, the President of the Board of Trade, went even further, and introduced a Bill
14
 
which proposed that any railway could be purchased, and stated that the rate of profit used in 
the calculation of the purchase price should be limited to 10 per cent, even if the railway was 
                                                          
13
 Parliamentary Papers 1844, XI, ‘Third Report from the Select Committee on Railways.’ 
14
 Parliamentary Papers 1844, IV, ‘Railways. A bill to attach certain conditions to the construction of future 
railways, authorized or to be authorized by any act of the present or succeeding sessions of Parliament, and for 
other purposes in relation to railways.’  
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earning much more than this. This reduced the expected price which the state would have to 
pay, as shown in Table 1. 
<< INSERT TABLE 1 >> 
However, opposition to the proposed Bill was vociferous. The Railway Times described it as 
the ‘Railway Plunder Bill’15, whilst the Economist had seldom seen ‘in any proposition such 
a mass of antiquated, exploded and objectionable principle’ and objected to the desire to limit 
profits
16
. A numerous deputation by the representatives of the various railway companies met 
the Prime Minister Robert Peel, and the proposer of the Bill, William Gladstone, which may 
be regarded as the first large scale campaign of the railway interest
17
. 
In the face of this opposition a revised bill
18
 was published which had only 24 clauses 
compared to the original 48. The time period of revision was extended from 15 to 21 years, 
and the calculations on how much shareholders would receive in the event of nationalisation 
became much more favourable, as shown in Table 1. The maximum cap on profits of 10 per 
cent was removed, and any purchase of a company earning less than 10 per cent would be 
subject to arbitration. Cleveland-Stevens
19
 remarked that 10 per cent had been the summit in 
the original Bill, but had become the base in the revised bill. The Railway Times
20
 was 
satisfied that ‘the serpent is now robbed of its sting’ and it passed the House of Commons as 
the Railway Regulation Act. 
                                                          
15
 Railway Times, 1844, 713 
16
 Economist, 1844, 962 
17
 Alderman, G. 1973, The Railway Interest, Leicester University Press, 16  
18
 Parliamentary Papers 1844, IV, ‘Railways. A Bill [as amended by the Committee] to Attach Certain 
Conditions to the Construction of Future Railways, Authorized or to be Authorized by any Act of the Present or 
Succeeding Sessions of Parliament, and for other Purposes in Relation to Railways.’ 
19
 Cleveland-Stevens, E.C. 1883, English Railways : Their Development and their Relation to the State, 
Routledge, 109 
20
 Railway Times, 1844, 825 
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If Parliament had enforced a more severe version of this legislation it is possible that investor 
expectations of future profits would have been reduced, and the extent of the Mania would 
not have been so dramatic. However, the opposition to the initial Bill was such that a harsh 
limit on profitability was not politically feasible. Consequently, the conditions were 
moderated, and were considered to have placed no effective restraint on the railways, 
encouraging investors to believe that high profits could be attained.  
2.2 Restricting Expansion 
The rapid expansion of the railway network was the most tangible consequence of the 
Railway Mania, and had a considerable influence on both the economy and the railway 
industry. The promotion of new railway schemes dramatically increased during the rise in 
share prices, with an estimated 1,238 projects seeking capital in 1845
21
. If the government 
had strictly limited the number of projects which could be constructed it may have restrained 
the boom in company promotions. It would also have reduced the severity of the downturn, 
which was largely due to declines in profitability resulting from overexpansion, and the 
difficulties of financing the construction of the proposed railways. 
Parliament had within its power the ability to impose such limits, as each new railway line 
had to be individually authorised, mainly because of the need to force property owners to sell 
their land along the chosen route
22
. This ability to approve or deny every new track gave 
Parliament the ability to manage in fine detail how the network developed. However, the 
mechanism by which new lines were authorised meant that a national plan for the railways 
was not adopted. 
                                                          
21
 The Times, November 17, 1845, p.4 
22
 Kostal, R.W. 1994, Law and English Railway Capitalism, Oxford University Press, 16 
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Each year the proposed railways were grouped by region and allocated to individual 
Parliamentary committees, each of which worked in isolation, meaning that a broad overview 
of the development of the network could not adopted. The fifth report of the Select 
Committee on Railways warned that ‘local interests will be chiefly regarded’ by these 
committees, making it ‘almost impossible to hope that ... there should issue any distinct 
system of sound general rules.’23 In response to this fear, the Railway Department of the 
Board of Trade was briefly asked to review all of the potential schemes and provide 
recommendations to Parliament, giving a national perspective. However, the suggestions of 
the Board were often ignored, and in July 1845, after just 11 months, the Railway Department 
was disbanded
24
.  
The focus on local provision tended to increase the likelihood that more railways would be 
constructed, as the competition between towns meant that each wanted its own railway 
connection
25
. In the 1845 Parliamentary session there were 44 separate committees appointed 
to consider the proposed schemes, each focussing on a particular area. Every committee, 
without exception, authorised at least one new railway
26
. In the 1846 Parliamentary Session 
there were 64 committees appointed
27
. Of the 516 Bills which were considered in this year, 
81 were thrown out on Standing Orders, 83 were withdrawn, 106 were rejected based on the 
                                                          
23
 Parliamentary Papers 1844, XI, Fifth report from the Select Committee on Railways; together with the 
minutes of evidence, appendix and index, 6 
24
 Cleveland-Stevens, E.C. 1883, English Railways : Their Development and their Relation to the State, 
Routledge, 134 
25
 Casson, Mark. “The Efficiency of the Victorian British Railway Network: A Counterfactual Analysis.” 
Networks and Spatial Economics 9 (2009), 375, and Casson, Mark. The World’s First Railway System: 
Enterprise, Competition, and Regulation on the Railway Network in Victorian Britain.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009, 277 
26
 Parliamentary Papers 1845, XXXIX, Railways. A return of the railway bills and projects, classified in their 
groups, which have been considered by the committees to whom they were referred; and whether such railway 
bills and projects were recommended or rejected by the said committees; the names of the members selected; 
and the number of days that the committee on each group has sat. 
27
 Cleveland-Stevens, E.C. 1883, English Railways : Their Development and their Relation to the State, 
Routledge, 65 
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merits of the scheme, and 246 received Royal Assent
28
. This implies that only a minority of 
projects were actually rejected, with a substantial proportion being approved. 
The extent of new railway authorisation led to construction representing 5.7, 6.7 and 4.7 per 
cent of GDP in 1846, 1847 and 1848 respectively
29
. The demands of railway companies for 
more capital to finance construction led to difficulties for many shareholders, and may have 
affected the wider economy. Many companies requested an extension to the length of time 
within which they were allowed to construct their lines, with railways requesting delays on 
the construction of a total of 3,650 miles of track
30
. Those railways which did open often 
duplicated existing routes, increasing competition, or served less populous districts, leading 
to lower returns on capital. The Economist
31
 argued that all recent experience had shown that 
the new lines had shown little or no profit.  
By regulating which railway lines could be constructed, Parliament could have reduced the 
extent of the boom, and the difficulties of the downturn. However, rather than developing an 
overview of the whole system, Parliament conducted enquires on a district by district basis, 
leading to an oversupply of new railways. Political expediency suggested that particular areas 
should not be deprived of access to a railway, but this produced longer-term problems for the 
railways themselves, and for the wider economy. 
2.3 Leverage Ratios 
Part of the attraction of the new schemes for investors was the ability to purchase shares on 
an instalment basis. Individuals could subscribe for shares by paying a small deposit, and 
                                                          
28
 Railway Times, 1846, 1402 
29
 Mitchell, B.R. 1964, ‘The Coming of the Railway and United Kingdom Economic Growth’, Journal of 
Economic History, 24(3): 315-336.  
30
 Parliamentary Papers 1847-48, LXIII, Railways. Return of the railway companies who have made 
application to the Commissioners of Railways under the 1st section of the act 11 Vict. c. 3, for an extension of 
the periods limited by their acts for the purchase of lands, or the completion of works. 
31
 Economist, October 21, 1848, 1187 
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then pay the remaining amount when the companies made ‘calls for capital’ to finance the 
construction of their lines. The first effect of this payment plan was to make it easier for 
investors to find the money to subscribe to new schemes. 
Another effect was to leverage the returns which investors could obtain. Subscribers gained 
exposure to the movements of the underlying asset for a small deposit. Small returns on an 
equivalent fully paid share were magnified by the effects of leverage to produce large returns 
on investors’ deposits. The Railway Investment Guide32 described it as a ‘peculiarity 
connected with this system, that a man possessed of very little capital to commence with, 
may at once treble or quadruple it’.  
Parliament could have prevented the use of partially paid shares by requiring new projects to 
collect a substantial fraction of the total cost of their lines before they could be considered for 
authorisation. Investors would have been required to pay up most of the capital immediately, 
thus reducing the effects of leverage on their investments. To restrain a minor promotional 
boom in 1837, Parliament had introduced a measure which moved in this direction, but set 
the required deposit at just 10 per cent
33
. In the aftermath of this boom there was little further 
promotional activity, so the requirement was relaxed to 5 per cent in May 1844
34
, but with the 
increase in projected schemes thereafter, it was raised to 10 per cent again in July 1845
35
.  
This increase may be regarded as an attempt to reduce speculation, but it was largely 
ineffective. Evans
36
 said that the increase in the deposit ‘did not in the least repress the ardour 
of speculators’. In the subsequent months the volume of new company promotion increased 
                                                          
32
 The Railway Investment Guide. How to Make Money in Railway Shares: A Series of Hints and Advice to 
Parties Speculating 1845, 5 
33
 Francis, J. 1851. A History of the English Railway, Vol II, 2 
34
 Francis, J. 1851. A History of the English Railway, Vol II, 97 
35
 Evans, D.M. 1849, The Commercial Crisis, 1847-1848, David and Charles, Devon, 16 
36
 Evans, D.M. 1849, The Commercial Crisis, 1847-1848, David and Charles, Devon, 16 
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even further, reaching its peak in October and November 1845. A requirement of just 10 per 
cent provided little restraint, and the leveraged returns which could still be obtained by 
purchasing partially paid shares remained very appealing. Given the enthusiasm for 
investment, a requirement of at least 50 per cent is likely to have still resulted in many of the 
most valid schemes still applying for authorisation. 
The failure to impose stricter limits on leverage ratios during the boom meant that there was a 
process of painful deleveraging during the downturn. When the construction of lines began, 
shareholders struggled to make the required payments. The Economist
37
 said that ‘every fresh 
call that was made upon exhausted shareholders was attended by one of two effects – either 
the shares themselves upon which the call had been made were sold in order to avoid 
payment, or some other shares were sold in order to raise the money for that purpose.’ Calls 
for capital by the railways were also blamed by both a House of Commons and a House of 
Lords Parliamentary Committee for exacerbating the Commercial Crisis of 1847,
38
 as they 
diverted investment from other uses. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 2 >> 
The use of leverage played an important role in encouraging investors to subscribe to the new 
railway schemes promoted during the Mania. The decision by Parliament to raise the required 
deposit can be interpreted as an attempt to restrain the speculation, but it was largely 
ineffective. The introduction of a much higher rate, which would have required shareholders 
to pay the full cost of the share immediately may have reduced the volume of company 
                                                          
37
 Economist, October 21, 1848, 1187 
38
 Parliamentary Papers 1847-48, VIII, Pt. I, ‘Reports from the Secret Committee on Commercial Distress; with 
an Index.’, and Parliamentary Papers 1847-48, VIII, Pt. III, ‘Report from the Secret Committee of the House of 
Lords appointed to inquire into the causes of the distress which has for some time prevailed among the 
commercial classes, and how far it has been affected by the laws for regulating the issue of bank notes payable 
on demand. Together with the minutes of evidence, and an appendix.’ 
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promotion during the boom, and the difficulties which resulted from the continual payments 
of calls for capital during the downturn. However, Parliament did not take such a dramatic 
step, preferring an incremental approach which proved to be insufficient. 
3 Corn Price Reversal 
The British government was also largely unsuccessful in dealing with a boom in the price of 
corn. The problems had commenced with a poor agricultural harvest in 1845, and were 
worsened by another poor harvest in 1846.  The price of wheat increased from 53 shillings 
per quarter in June 1846, to 61s by the end of the year, reaching 77s by March 1847, before 
peaking at 102s at the start of June 1847, as shown in Figure 3. However, prices then fell 
rapidly during the summer of 1847, reaching just 49.5s in the middle of September, implying 
a fall of over 50 per cent in less than four months. The price declines led to a series of failures 
amongst corn merchants, who had speculated on prices remaining high, with the City 
Intelligence column of The Times indicating that 12 firms involved in the corn trade failed in 
August 1847, and others followed in subsequent months. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 3 >> 
To have moderated the price reversal, policy could have been targeted at preventing the 
initial price increases, or at delaying the ensuing price declines. The British government 
focussed its attention almost exclusively on minimising the price rises, by using the standard 
mechanism for influencing the price of a commodity, namely the adjustment of import duties. 
The price of corn had traditionally been affected by the Corn Laws, but in June 1846 
legislation was passed which led to their repeal. This Act reduced the corn import duties, 
which were then 17 shillings per quarter of wheat, to between 4 shillings and 10 shillings 
14 
 
until February 1849, after which time a fixed duty of 1 shilling would be charged
39
. By 
liberalising the market for corn, this should have led to an increase in imports, lower prices, 
and reduced volatility in the corn market.  
However, as the reduction in tariffs was phased, there was still a duty of 4 shillings being 
charged in January 1847, as shown in Figure 4, when the price of wheat had risen to about 70 
shillings per quarter. The navigation laws were also still in force, which restricted imports to 
ships which were either British or belonged to the exporting country
40
. It was only with the 
opening of the new session of Parliament in January 1847 that both the duties and the 
navigation laws were suspended
41
. This led immediately to a much higher volume of wheat 
being entered for home consumption, which had already been physically imported, during 
February, and a stabilising of the wheat price at about 70 shillings. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 4 >> 
Despite the more liberal conditions, the volume of imports did not increase substantially 
thereafter, and the price of wheat began to rise again, particularly between the start of May, 
when it was 75 shillings, and the start of June, when it reached a peak of 102 shillings.  With 
prices at such a high level, imports finally responded, and increased substantially. From July 
1847 to the end of October 1847 weekly wheat imports exceeded 100,000 quarters for 15 
weeks in a row, having exceeded this level in only week during the previous four years, as 
shown in Figure 4. This led to sharp price declines and financial difficulties for corn 
merchants who had expected prices to remain high.  
                                                          
39
 Parliamentary Papers 1846, I, ‘Corn importation. A bill to amend the laws relating to the importation of 
corn.’  
40
 Economist, January 16, 1847, 57 
41
 Economist, January 23, 1847, 85 
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The policy pursued by the British government during this period attempted to avert the price 
rises by liberalising the market for corn. When the gradual phasing out of the Corn Laws was 
deemed inadequate, all duties were suspended. They also opened the ports to allow imports 
on ships from other countries. However, the most dramatic price rises occurred after, and in 
spite of, the liberal policy. Given that they had been ineffective in preventing the price rises, 
the government could have attempted to manage the price declines, by reintroducing duties 
and quotas immediately. Such a policy may have delayed the crash in the corn price which 
occurred, and may have prevented the corn merchants from experiencing such dramatic 
losses. However, in June 1847, at the peak in prices, the suspension of duties had been 
extended to March 1848
42
. The reversal of this policy may have improved financial stability, 
but it would have been deeply unpopular with the public who would have been forced to pay 
the higher prices. It also conflicted with the long-term goal of revoking the Corn Laws, as the 
opponents of reform could have pointed to their usefulness at this time. Consequently, the 
price reversal was able to occur, and led to widespread problems in the corn sector which 
then spread to other merchants and some financial institutions.   
4 Commercial Crisis 
After the initial mercantile failures, the difficult situation was exacerbated by legislation 
which the government had introduced several years before, namely the Bank Charter Act, 
which made it more difficult for the Bank of England to provide credit during the crisis. 
Under this Act the Bank had a limited reserve of notes and coin, and if it exhausted these 
resources it would have to suspend payment. In the year prior to the crisis, the reserve of the 
Banking Department of the Bank of England had declined steadily as gold was withdrawn for 
the payment of imports of corn. In April 1847 the low reserve had become a cause for 
                                                          
42
 Parliamentary Papers 1847 I, ‘Corn, &c., importation. A bill to suspend, for a time to be limited, the duties 
on the importation of corn, maize, rice, grain, meal, flour, biscuit, and certain other similar articles.’  
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concern, so to restore its position the Bank had rapidly reduced its holdings of securities, 
causing a ‘pressure’ for money. The reserve rose briefly, but remained at lower levels than in 
previous years. 
This gave the Bank limited scope to respond when the failures in the corn sector were 
followed by difficulties amongst other merchants. In September there were failures amongst 
those involved with trade in East India, Mauritius, South America, coal and wine
43
. Failures 
amongst some merchants contributed to difficulties amongst others with whom they had dealt 
and owed money to. For example, the failure of Gemmell and Co., a merchant based in 
Glasgow, was named as the immediate cause of the failure of at least three other firms. 
However, these other firms had pre-existing difficulties, with The Times noting that the 
position of Gower, Nephews and Co. had been doubtful for the previous two years,
44
 Watson 
Brothers had insufficient capital for a considerable period
45
, and Lyall Brothers and Co. had 
extended their business beyond the amount warranted by their capital
46
. 
As traders suspended payment, financial institutions began to experience problems. The 
failure of Lesley Alexander and Co., a corn merchant, and of some other smaller firms, led to 
the suspension of the major bill broker Sanderson and Co. in September 1847, who had held 
much of their paper. This gave ‘rise to the utmost anxiety.’47 The reluctance of other financial 
firms to provide credit led to a higher discount rate, as shown in Figure 5 for one of the other 
major money brokers, Overend and Gurney.   
<< INSERT FIGURE 5>> 
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These difficulties led to an increased demand on the Bank of England for discounting. 
Although the reserve of the Banking Department was already at relatively low levels, the 
Bank allowed its reserve to decline further in an attempt to provide credit. The level of the 
reserve fell throughout the summer, and with the payment of the October dividends to 
government bondholders, the notes in the Banking reserve fell to a perilously low level. 
The Bank was forced to refuse any further advances on Exchequer bills or Consol warrants, 
leading to a ‘panic’. Four joint stock banks in Liverpool, Newcastle and Wales stopped 
payment and numerous small country banks were declared insolvent
48
. Mercantile failures 
continued and Evans stated that the ‘week of terror’, ending October 23, would ‘long linger 
in the remembrance of those who witnessed its career’49. The crisis was only relieved with 
the suspension of the Bank Charter Act, which had limited the reserve which the Bank could 
use for discounting. 
4.1 Bank Charter Act 
During the previous decades the Bank of England had faced difficulties on several occasions, 
most recently in 1839
50
. These problems had led some to conclude that crises were caused by 
an unsustainable overexpansion of notes which raised prices. This led to higher imports and 
an outflow of bullion in payment, much of which would be withdrawn from the Bank of 
England.  If the decline in the reserve was not stopped by higher interest rates, it could lead to 
a monetary crisis as the Bank would not be able to convert notes to gold.  
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In an attempt to prevent these crises from recurring the British government introduced the 
Bank Charter Act in 1844
51
, with the intention of making the paper currency function like a 
metallic currency, thus restricting changes in the note supply. Under this legislation the note 
issuing powers of the country banks were restricted, and the Bank of England was divided 
into two separate divisions, the Issue Department and the Banking Department
52
. The Issue 
Department was to hold £14m of securities and a certain amount of gold and silver coin and 
bullion, and would allow anyone to exchange notes for gold at a fixed price. Only an increase 
in the holdings of gold in the Issue Department could lead to an increase in the note supply. 
The Banking Department of the Bank of England was to act in a manner similar to a private 
bank
53
. It held a reserve of notes and coin with which it could meet the needs of depositors, 
and it could advance funds by discounting securities. The interest rate which it offered on 
these securities would largely depend on its ‘banking reserve’. 
The Bank Charter Act ensured that the amount of currency outside the Issue Department 
moved in line with flows of bullion into and out of the country. If gold was needed for export, 
notes would have to be exchanged for it at the Issue Department, thus removing them from 
circulation. This should result in lower prices, increasing the exports of goods and the import 
of gold, thus providing automatic stabilisation. However, the amount of currency in 
circulation outside the Bank, in the hands of the public, was also affected by the size of the 
reserve held by the Banking Department. If the banking reserve decreased, an outflow of 
bullion might be sterilised, and the amount of currency in circulation outside the bank remain 
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unchanged
54
. It can be seen from Figure 6 that changes in the Issue Department were often 
offset by changes in the Banking reserve, and the notes in circulation outside the Bank 
remained fairly stable. This suggests that the circulation in the hands of the public did not 
fluctuate with the import and export of bullion, implying that the management of the Banking 
Department interfered with the operation of the stabilisation mechanism. Whether this was 
beneficial or harmful to the economy is debateable, as discussed below, but it illustrates that 
legislation may not operate as its authors intended. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 6>> 
The changes in both the Issue and Banking Departments were most pronounced in the year 
prior to the crisis. After the discovery of the poor harvest of 1846 there was a sustained 
outflow of gold, and the notes issued by the Issue Department fell from £29.9m in September 
1846 to £22.5m in April 1847, as shown in Figure 6. However, the Banking reserve also fell, 
from £10.3m to £3.1m. The Bank had raised its discount rate from 3.0 per cent to 3.5 per 
cent, and then 4.0 per cent in January 1847, but it did not raise it further, even as its reserve 
steadily decreased. The Times commented that ‘the extraordinary apathy of the Bank of the 
England from January last up to the stage we have now reached in our monetary affairs is 
beginning to excite universal comment, and to be regarded with universal apprehension.’55  
It was not until the low point of April that the Bank responded by raising its discount rate to 5 
per cent and by reducing the availability of discounting. Although the reserve increased, it 
remained lower than in previous years. With the beginning of the failures in August 1847 the 
Bank raised its discount rate to 5.5 per cent but did not raise it further, even though its reserve 
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continued to decline. In an attempt to provide credit it actually reduced its rate on loans to 5 
per cent in September 1847. With the payment of the dividends to government bondholders 
in October 1847 the Banking reserve fell to just £2.0 m, as shown in Figure 6. 
The Bank of England had attempted to provide stability to the economy in the face of the 
substantial outflow of gold which had occurred, and the onset of commercial failures. It could 
be argued that such a policy was flawed as it hindered the automatic stabilisation which had 
been envisaged in the Bank Charter Act. However, it is likely that allowing such rapid 
changes to have occurred without any response would have been even more damaging.  
The effect of the Bank Charter Act was to place the entire responsibility for counteracting 
this contraction with the Banking Department. Under the system prior to the Bank Charter 
Act, the Bank had to retain sufficient total reserves to ensure both the convertibility of notes 
to gold, and to cover its deposits. Under the new system the reserve in the Issue Department 
ensured convertibility, and the reserve in the Banking Department covered deposits. The 
reserve of one department could not be used to meet the needs of the other. Tooke argued that 
the Act made the crisis more severe ‘by diminishing the power of the bank to grant 
accommodation in consequence of the narrow limit of its banking reserve ... There was no 
less than £6.25m in the issue department, which was as little available as if it had been in 
China’.56 Combining the bullion in both departments would have helped the bank to continue 
discounting, but if the drain in bullion continued, the convertibility of the note would also 
have been at risk. Samuel Jones Loyd, who was regarded as one of the framers of the Bank 
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Charter Act, argued that the Act had been successful in its aims, by preventing the Bank from 
allowing its bullion to fall so low that it also endangered the convertibility of the note.
57
  
The Bank Charter Act illustrates that legislation may have unintended consequences. The 
automatic stabilisation which it was intended to provide was nullified by the management of 
the Banking reserve. The Act ultimately contributed to the panic because it shifted risk from 
one part of the monetary system to another, reducing the risk of inconvertibility of the note, 
but increasing the risk of the deposits held in the Banking Department.  
4.2 Suspension of Bank Charter Act 
To alleviate the crisis the Prime Minister, Lord John Russell, and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Charles Wood, sent a letter to the Bank which recommended that the Bank of 
England ‘enlarge the amount of their discounts and advances’, but that the ‘rate of interest 
should not be less than 8 per cent’58. The Bank would not be held liable for any infringement 
of the Bank Charter Act. This implied that the Bank would be able to use the reserve of gold 
held in the Issue Department to meet the needs of the Banking Department. The effect of this 
letter was to allow the Bank to extend credit beyond what would be possible with the existing 
Banking reserve, which stood at just £2.0m on October 23.  
The knowledge that the Bank could provide additional assistance was enough to allay the 
panic. Samuel Gurney, a prominent banker, said that ‘the effect was immediate. Those 
[customers] who had sent notice for their money in the morning sent us word that they did 
not want it – that they had only ordered payment by way of precaution.’59 From that date 
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there was a gradual but progressive return to confidence.
60
 The reserve fell to £1.6m on 
October 30, but it recovered thereafter and the restrictions imposed by the Bank Charter Act 
were never infringed. It then increased steadily, to £2.3m by November 6, to £5.6m by 
November 27, and £8.4m by December 25, as shown in Figure 6. 
The policy pursued by the government in October 1847 was effective for at least three 
reasons. Firstly, it had a clear goal, secondly, it proposed a suitable remedy, and thirdly, that 
remedy was not opposed by interested parties. Each of these factors was only possible 
because the crisis was ongoing, suggesting that policy responses during a crisis are more 
targetted, and are more likely to implemented, than any suggestions which are made in 
advance. 
As the crisis was current, the goal of reducing instability was paramount. Attempting to frame 
legislation to prevent crises which may or may not occur in the future is inherently difficult, 
as there must be trade-offs between the likelihood of more stability and the restrictiveness 
which is imposed. However, during a crisis the focus is placed entirely on resolving the 
distress, and those measures which are most likely to be successful can be employed, with 
less regard to their longer term consequences. 
Government policy was also successful because it proposed an appropriate response to the 
problem. The suspension of the Act was not an inevitable decision, and the Bank of England 
Governor argued that ‘as far as the Bank was concerned we did not require any relaxation’.61 
The bank could have attempted to sell some its holdings of government securities to raise 
cash, or it could have refused all requests for discounting. However, Tooke argued that the 
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former course was impractical as the securities could only have been sold at such a low price 
that it could not be contemplated
62
. The latter course of action, of restricting discounting, may 
have ensured the Bank retained a reserve but would have intensified the panic. The path 
which was chosen by the government had fewer risks, and was repeated in future crises. 
Increasing confidence that the central bank would act as a lender of last resort during a crisis 
has since become a standard policy prescription
63
. 
The policy proposed by the government could be implemented quickly, and have an 
immediate impact, because it was not opposed. The crisis was having a detrimental effect on 
businesses, bankers and the public, so there was almost universal support for some measure 
to relieve it. The Bank of England argued that they could have carried on without the issue of 
the government letter, but they were in no way opposed to it. Even Samuel Jones Loyd, a 
banker who had helped to frame the Act and defended it vigorously, agreed that 
‘circumstances may occur in mercantile affairs ... that some interposition may be desirable for 
the purpose of alleviating the intensity of the pressure arising from destruction of 
confidence.’64 
However, the issue of the Government letter had one disadvantage. Even though it referred to 
the suspension of the Act as an ‘extraordinary and temporary measure,’65 William Cotton, a 
former Governor of the Bank of England, believed that it was likely to lead people to expect a 
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similar letter in future
66
. The Economist commented that ‘it will be impossible to destroy a 
feeling which for many years must pervade the public mind, that the pressure must only be 
severe enough, and the demands loud enough, in order to procure a suspension of any 
restriction which may exist.’67 Subsequent events proved these suspicions to be correct, with 
the Act again suspended in 1857 and 1866. Responding in the midst of a crisis thus met with 
much less opposition than any policies which could have been introduced prior to the 
difficulties, but it led to an increase in moral hazard. By increasing expectations that the Act 
could be suspended, it may have encouraged increased risk taking as it was more likely that 
the Bank of England would always be available as a lender of last resort, regardless of the 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the benefits of the suspension were almost certainly greater than 
the costs. 
5 Conclusion 
The British government responded to the Railway Mania, corn price reversal, and 
Commercial Crisis of the 1840s in a variety of ways. The policies which were pursued before 
the crash in prices and the onset of financial distress were generally unsuccessful. However, 
this does not necessarily imply that the government should be strongly criticised for its 
actions. It was, like other administrations before and since, faced with the challenge of 
legislating in the midst of uncertainty. This meant that it had to balance the possible benefits 
of increased stability against the additional costs which this would impose, and there was a 
lack of clarity about the impact of the policies which it did introduce. The parliamentary 
system also ensured that legislation had to obtain broad support, so bold initiatives which 
may have been opposed by interested parties were not feasible. Government action was most 
effective in the midst of the crisis, when these considerations were less of a concern.  
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The experience of the 1840s suggests that attempts to legislate to prevent future instability is 
challenging, so crises are likely to occur again. When they do, a vigorous response by 
government may help to mitigate the extent of the difficulties. The specific form of 
intervention will depend on the unique circumstances of the crisis. The Commercial Crisis of 
1847 was relieved by increasing the ability of the Bank of England to act as a lender of last 
resort. However, it was successful because it targeted the particular problem at this time. In 
other periods of crisis a similar strategy has been successful, but each episode has unique 
characteristics and the response should target the particular constraint in that period. It may 
be impossible to eradicate crises, but intervention may be of some use when they do occur.   
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Figure 1: Railway Share Price Index and Number of Railway Securities 
Listed on London Stock Exchange, 1843-50 
 
Notes: Railway share index and number of securities listed on London Stock Exchange calculated 
from weekly share price tables in Railway Times. 
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Figure 2: Railway Calls on Capital and Share Price Index, 1843-50 
 
 
Notes: Railway share index and volume of calls calculated from weekly share price tables in Railway Times.  
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Figure 3: Wheat Price and Company Failures, 1843-50 
 
Notes: The price of wheat has been obtained on a weekly basis from the London Gazette. The 
number of failures has been calculated by searching the City Intelligence column of The Times 
for any firm which was described as having failed or which had suspended. 
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Figure 4: Wheat Imports and Duties on Foreign Wheat, 1843-50 
 
Notes: The quantity of wheat imported and the duty on foreign wheat has been obtained on a 
weekly basis from the London Gazette. 
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Figure 5: Discount Rate for First Class Bills, 1843-50 
 
Notes: Discount rate on first class bills for Overend and Gurney from Parliamentary Papers, 1857, pp.475-
476, and minimum rate of interest for Bank of England, Parliamentary Papers, 1857, Appendix, pp.122-133. 
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Figure 6: Bank of England Notes Issued, Held Outside the Bank, and Held in 
the Banking Department, 1844-50 
 
Notes: Weekly data on Issue Department and Banking Reserve obtained from Parliamentary Papers (1847-48, VIII, 
Pt. II, p.16-21; 1850, XXXIII, p.202-211; and1852-53, LVII, p.328-335). Outside Bank calculated as Issue 
Department minus Banking Reserve. 
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Table 1: Implied Purchase Price of Railways According to Recommendations of 
Different Proposals 
 
   
Purchase Price of a Share, with a £100 par value, 
which was paying a dividend of: 
 Number of Years 
Before Purchase 
Considered 
 
3 per cent 15 per cent 
     
Select Committee 15  Not Purchased £375 
Gladstone’s Bill 15  £75 £250 
Railway Regulation Act 21  Subject to Arbitration £375 
     
 Notes: Adapted from Cleveland-Stevens, E.C. 1883, English Railways : Their Development and their Relation to the State, Routledge, 110.  
